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using market-based 
indicators to Assess banking 
System Resilience
Cameron MacDonald and Maarten R. C. van Oordt
  Market-based indicators are quantitative tools that can be used to gauge 
the market’s assessment of the resilience of the banking system. These 
indicators are based on information from financial markets and are thus 
timely, reflect expectations of future performance and offer good compa-
rability across regions and through time.
  However, since they reflect the beliefs of market participants who could 
incorrectly assess banking system risks, market-based indicators could 
overstate or understate banking system resilience. For this reason, 
market-based indicators complement, rather than replace, other mea-
sures of resilience based on regulatory and accounting information.
  Market-based indicators suggest that markets perceive major Canadian 
banks to be currently better placed to handle adverse shocks than their 
counterparts in other advanced economies. Compared with regulatory 
capital ratios, however, market-based indicators suggest less improve-
ment in banking system resilience since the pre-crisis period. This report 
discusses several explanations for this divergence. 
  When compared with banking systems in other advanced economies 
at the onset of banking crises since the 1990s, the Canadian banking 
system is seen by market participants as relatively resilient. Moreover, 
a market-based measure of the expected capital shortfall in the banking 
system under stressed conditions suggests that markets view Canadian 
banks as able to withstand a severe system-wide shock.
Introduction
The Bank of Canada regularly assesses vulnerabilities in the Canadian 
financial system using the approach set out by Christensen et al. (2015). 
The assessment incorporates a variety of quantitative and qualitative 
sources of information that span the entire financial system. This report, in 
contrast, focuses exclusively on the information contained in market data as 
it pertains to the banking system. The data are processed into indicators to 
ensure a more structured interpretation of market information. These indica-
tors are referred to as “market-based” because of their reliance on market 
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data such as stock prices. The market-based indicators shed light on how 
market participants evaluate the resilience of the banking system, which can 
complement analysis based on accounting and regulatory information.
In the sections that follow, the advantages and disadvantages of market-
based indicators are discussed. An index of market-based indicators is 
then constructed and used to infer market perceptions of the resilience of 
the Canadian banking system over time and in comparison with banking 
systems in other advanced economies. Furthermore, we examine potential 
explanations for why market-based indicators show less improvement since 
the pre-crisis period than the generally positive trend observed in regulatory 
capital ratios. Lastly, historical comparisons and a “market-based stress 
test” are used to provide some insight into the market’s assessment of the 
current level of resilience of the Canadian banking system.
Advantages and Disadvantages
Market-based indicators are one of the tools that the Bank uses to analyze 
the resilience of the banking system. Compared with other indicators, such 
as accounting-based measures, market-based indicators have the advan-
tage of providing a near-real-time outlook because market prices are quick 
to reflect changing expectations of market participants. These indicators are 
also forward-looking in the sense that market prices incorporate expecta-
tions about future earnings. For these reasons, market-based indicators 
tend to be more responsive to changes in banking system resilience than 
balance-sheet metrics such as regulatory capital ratios. Furthermore, 
market-based indicators are less sensitive to differences in accounting 
regimes, which makes them especially suitable for cross-country compari-
sons. Finally, by reflecting the views of market participants, these indicators 
help us understand market funding and investment decisions such as 
willingness to roll over bank funding in times of stress. Since a worsening in 
market perceptions could potentially cause trouble for banks in the form of 
funding and market liquidity issues, monitoring these indicators is important 
even if markets incorrectly assess banking system risks. 
Because market participants could be wrong about banking system risks, 
market-based indicators complement, rather than replace, other meas-
ures of resilience. Moreover, market-based indicators have several other 
limitations. First, they can reflect the noise present in market data as well 
as uncertainty inherent in the methodologies used to estimate them. As 
a result, small changes in these indicators may not be very meaningful. 
In addition, these indicators embed market expectations of the effects 
of potential government interventions to support distressed banks and 
therefore do not assess the stand-alone risk profile of the banking system. 
Confidential regulatory data may also provide a more accurate or granular 
view than public data available to market participants. Finally, challenges 
can arise in the interpretation of indicators: for example, when relying solely 
on market data it may be difficult to disentangle whether high correlations 
are due to common exposures or direct interlinkages between banks.
An Index of Market-Based Indicators
A banking system can be considered more resilient if it has a higher cap-
acity to withstand and quickly recover from a wide array of shocks. All 
else being equal, a banking system is better able to withstand and quickly 
recover from shocks if (i) it has larger initial capital and liquidity buffers to 
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absorb shocks, (ii) the system-wide impact of shocks is smaller, and (iii) the 
banks in the system are able to quickly rebuild their capital from retained 
earnings after a shock occurs.
To monitor the market’s perception of the current state of banking system 
resilience and facilitate comparisons across regions and time, we construct 
a composite index that broadly measures these aspects of banking system 
resilience.1 The index incorporates five widely implemented market-based 
indicators: a market-based capital ratio (MBCR), distance to default 
(DD), exposure ΔCoVaR (difference in conditional value-at-risk), marginal 
expected shortfall (MES) and long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES). 
Box 1 provides a brief explanation of each of these indicators. 
The indicators can be roughly categorized into two types. The first is 
based on the market valuations of banks (MBCR and DD), which in turn 
depend on the level of the banks’ capital buffers and expectations of their 
future profitability. These aspects are relevant to the resilience of individual 
banks regardless of whether shocks are bank-specific or system-wide. 
In comparison, the second type of indicator mainly considers resilience 
related to the system-wide impact of severe shocks (exposure ΔCoVaR, 
MES and LRMES). These indicators account for the degree of interlinkages 
and common exposures within a banking system as perceived by market 
participants,2 which can increase the system-wide impact of shocks. 
Moreover, they are also sensitive to vulnerabilities associated with unstable 
funding profiles, which can threaten the continuity of banks and thus future 
earnings (López-Espinosa et al. 2012, 2013).
We construct a banking system resilience index for different countries 
and regions by averaging the individual indicators using weights based 
on their standard deviations.3 This ensures a roughly equal contribution of 
each indicator to changes in the index. The level of the index for Canada in 
2004, which covers the Big Six banks (see the Appendix), is taken as the 
base value of zero, and all other values are expressed relative to that. With 
this base year, the long-term average for Canada since 1990 is close to an 
index value of zero. An increase in the level of the index corresponds to a 
higher level of banking system resilience based on market perceptions. In 
particular, every 100-point increase in the index is equivalent to a doubling 
of the indicators related to the banks’ capital buffers and their future profit-
ability (MBCR and DD), and a halving of indicators related to the system-
wide impact of shocks (exposure ΔCoVaR, MES and LRMES). 
The level of the index is comparable across regions and time.4 However, in 
terms of resilience, the comparability over time is affected by variation in 
market valuations on an aggregate level that is related to discount rates and 
not to expected future dividends. Discount rates are affected by changes in 
the yield curve and risk premiums over time (Cochrane 2011), which depend 
on saving behaviour and global risk appetite, among other factors, but they 
1 There may be other aspects of resilience that are not completely captured by these indicators. 
Including indicators that better capture these other aspects would result in a broader index but 
could also affect the historical and geographical availability of the index because of additional data 
requirements.
2 Market-based measures for the degree of interlinkages and common exposures tend to be highly 
correlated to broad regulatory measures of interconnectedness used to classify systemically important 
banks (Van Oordt and Zhou 2015). 
3 These are Australia, Canada, the euro area, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4 To ensure greater comparability between the MBCRs of banks reporting under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), we adjust 
the amount of total assets of US banks for differences in derivatives netting following the procedure 
described by the IFRS Foundation (2015). 
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are also influenced by the unconventional monetary policies of some central 
banks over the past few years. Cross-country comparisons at the same 
point in time are less affected by the changes in the yield curve and risk 
premiums over time.
The Evolution in Global Banking System Resilience Since 
the Financial Crisis
Chart 1 provides a summary view of how the resilience of the banking 
systems of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
the euro area has evolved over the past decade. The overall pattern of 
movements in the index is broadly similar across countries and regions, 
which suggests that market perceptions of banking system resilience at the 
Box 1
Market-Based Indicators in the Index of Banking System Resilience
This box briefl y explains the fi ve indicators used in calcu-
lating the banking system resilience index . Each indicator 
is calculated for individual banks and then aggregated 
for the banking system by calculating a weighted average . 
Details on the methodology to estimate each of these indi-
cators and other background information is provided in 
MacDonald, Van Oordt and Scott (2016) .
The market-based capital ratio (MBCR) is a measure of a 
bank’s capital buff er based on market valuations . More pre-
cisely, the MBCR is defi ned as the market value of common 
equity as a percentage of the market value of total assets, 
where the market value of total assets is calculated as the 
sum of the market value of common equity and the book 
value of total debt . The MBCR is somewhat analogous to 
the Basel III leverage ratio in the sense that assets are not 
risk-weighted .
The distance to default (DD) is a proxy for the number of 
standard deviations of a shock to the market value of a 
bank’s assets that would erase its equity capital . A smaller 
DD indicates that a less extreme shock could potentially 
eliminate the institution’s capital, suggesting a higher prob-
ability of default . Its level is calculated as roughly the diff er-
ence between the market value of assets and the face value 
of debt, expressed as a ratio of the annualized volatility of 
the asset value .1 Since the DD includes a correction for asset 
risk, it is somewhat analogous to risk-weighted regulatory 
capital ratios such as the common equity Tier 1 ratio . 
The marginal expected shortfall (MES) and the long-run 
marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) measure the expected 
loss of an institution if the banking system suff ers a sudden 
adverse shock . while the MES measures one-day losses of 
a bank conditional upon a system-wide shock, the LRMES 
1 The measure is estimated based on the Merton model (Merton 1974) .
provides an expected cumulative loss of market value over a 
longer period (typically six months) .2 The higher the MES (or 
LRMES), the greater the impact of a system-wide shock . The 
MES is estimated as the average of a bank’s equity returns 
during the worst 5 per cent of days for the banking system 
in that country or region over the past two years (Acharya, 
Engle and Richardson 2012) . Our procedure to estimate 
the LRMES of a bank involves modelling the relationship 
between an individual bank’s equity returns and the returns 
on an index with all other institutions in the banking system, 
while allowing for volatility and correlations to vary over 
time (Acharya et al . 2017; Brownlees and Engle 2017) . This 
relationship is used to simulate a large number of potential 
paths for the bank’s and the system’s equity returns over 
the next six months . The LRMES is then calculated as the 
median return of the bank in the simulations with the worst 
1 per cent of outcomes for the system . 
The MES and LRMES both focus on the expected loss in a 
hypothetical stress scenario . In contrast, exposure ∆CoVaR 
(diff erence in conditional value-at-risk) focuses on the 
increase in downside tail risk of a bank, conditional upon 
a system-wide shock (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016) . Its 
level depends not only on the level of expected losses but 
also on how risk evolves in a potential stress scenario . A 
larger exposure ∆CoVaR therefore indicates a higher degree 
of sensitivity of a bank’s individual distress to shocks in the 
banking system . The exposure ∆CoVaR is computed as the 
increase in an institution’s daily value-at-risk with a 95 per 
cent confi dence level conditional upon the system suff ering 
a loss equal to the system’s own value-at-risk . The level of 
the exposure ∆CoVaR is calculated using quantile regres-
sion techniques .
2 Historical experience shows that banking crises have the potential to last much 
longer than six months (Laeven and Valencia 2013) .
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regional level are strongly influenced by global events. However, the magni-
tude of changes in the index in response to these events has varied across 
countries and regions.
The evolution of the resilience index levels for the Canadian and Australian 
banking systems during the 2008–09 financial crisis supports the view that 
these countries were relatively less affected than other advanced econ-
omies (see also Sarin and Summers 2016, 101). At the beginning of 2008, 
the resilience index for the US, UK and euro area banking systems had 
reached levels between -70 and -90. At the trough in March 2009, the index 
for these regions had fallen to levels around -190 in the euro area and the 
United Kingdom and -210 in the United States. In comparison, the resilience 
index for Canada had fallen to a value of -120. The nearly 100-point differ-
ence implies that, at the deepest point in the crisis, the US banking system 
was substantially worse off in measures of resilience compared with the 
Canadian banking system.
Another example of the differences across regions is observed in the 
recovery phase after their index levels had reached their lowest point in 
the crisis. In particular, the improvement in the index was much slower 
for the euro area than for other regions once the European sovereign 
debt crisis began escalating in 2010. In contrast, the resilience index for 
Canada reached into positive territory for the first time since the crisis in 
September 2012. 
In the second half of 2014, the generally positive trend reversed following 
rising concerns about the global growth outlook that coincided with a sig-
nificant decline in oil and other commodity prices. The initial reversal was 
more pronounced for Canada, suggesting that market participants viewed 
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Concerns about global growth 
and declining oil prices
Evolution in market perceptions of banking system resilience, 
by region
Index: Canada in January 2004 = 0, higher values imply greater perceived resilience
 Canada  United Statesa  Euro area  Australia  United Kingdom
Notes: The resilience index is constructed as a weighted average of fi ve sub-indexes based on the following 
indicators: MBCR, DD, MES, LRMES and exposure ΔCoVaR (see Box 1). The sub-index weights function to 
normalize for differences in volatility across indicators. See MacDonald, Van Oordt and Scott (2016) and the 
Appendix for more details on the calculations behind the index.
a. When calculating the MBCR of US banks, total assets are adjusted to account for differences in 
derivatives n etting across accounting regimes.
Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank of Canada calculations Last observation: April 2017
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sector as limiting their ability to quickly recover from additional setbacks in 
the future, although not to the same extent as in 2008–09. Since early 2016, 
the index for Canada has once again been improving along with the outlook 
for global growth and a partial recovery in commodity prices, while the euro 
area and UK banking systems have faced additional setbacks from uncer-
tainty surrounding the Brexit referendum and non-performing loans at Italian 
banks.
The current level of the resilience index for Canada remains above that of 
all other regions examined. This is consistent with the typically narrower 
credit spreads of Canadian banks compared with many of their global peers 
(see, e.g., Bank of Canada 2016, 23). Moreover, the ranking of regions was 
fairly similar across the different index components in April 2017 (Chart 2), 
suggesting that the relative resilience of the Canadian banking system is 
independent of the weights used to construct the index from the individual 
market-based indicators.  
Banking System Resilience and Regulatory Capital Ratios
Market-based indicators suggest less improvement in banking system 
resilience than regulatory capital ratios do. The previous section shows that 
market-based indicators suggest markets do not regard banks as substan-
tially more resilient than they were in the pre-crisis period. This is particularly 
true for banks in the euro area, which market-based indicators suggest are 
less resilient than before the crisis. This is a different picture than that pro-
vided by regulatory capital ratios, which have improved substantially in all 
jurisdictions since the pre-crisis period (Chart 3). There are several possible 
explanations for this divergence.5
First, market-based indicators of banking system resilience reflect the 
expectation that banks have a reduced ability to replenish capital buffers as 
a consequence of weaker profitability, while regulatory capital ratios omit 
this information. Regulatory and accounting-based capital ratios provide 
a backward-looking measure of bank resilience and are unaffected by 
changes in expected future profits. In contrast, a reduction in expected 
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Chart 2: Comparison of index components across regions as of April 2017
Index: Canada in January 2004 = 0, higher values imply greater perceived resilience 
 Canada  United States  Euro area  Australia  United Kingdom
Sour ces: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank of Canada calculations Last observation: April 2017
MBCR DD MES LRMES Exposure 
ΔCoVaR
Individual resilience System-wide impact of shocks
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future profits does lower the market valuation of a bank. This component of 
a bank’s market valuation related to future profits is reflected in the premium 
of a bank’s market value relative to its book value. Indeed, price-to-book 
ratios have fallen along with a downward trend in return on equity across 
jurisdictions since the crisis (Chart 4).
Several factors could be driving the weaker outlook for bank profitability, 
including the impact of a relatively flat yield curve on banks’ net interest 
margins, a weaker global economic outlook than before the crisis, a reduced 
impact of implicit government guarantees on bank funding costs, increased 
regulatory compliance costs and regulatory restrictions on profitable busi-
ness lines such as proprietary trading (United States), elevated political and 
economic uncertainty (euro area, United Kingdom and United States) and 
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Chart 3: Median Tier 1 capital ratio of major banks, by region
 Canada  United States  Euro area  Australia  United Kingdom
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Chart 4: Median price-to-book ratio and return on equity of major banks, by region
a. Price-to-book ratio b. Return on equity
 Canada  United States  Euro area  Australia  United Kingdom
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream Last observation: 2016
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Second, market-based indicators of banking system resilience suggest that 
the system-wide impact of shocks has remained relatively high since the 
financial crisis, which could be due to a remaining high level of interconnect-
edness, common exposures and complexity within banking systems as 
well as banking system consolidation and elevated global uncertainty in the 
post-crisis period. The Tier 1 capital ratios shown in Chart 3 do not account 
for these aspects of resilience.6
Third, the improvements in banking sector resilience relative to the pre-crisis 
period might not be fully captured by market-based indicators if market 
participants underestimated banking system risks before the financial crisis. 
This explanation assumes markets have become more aware of, or better 
at internalizing, the risks associated with unstable funding profiles and 
interconnected banking systems since the financial crisis, resulting in an 
overly optimistic base case and therefore an underestimation of the actual 
improvement in resilience. Moreover, international efforts to implement 
bail-in regimes that allow authorities to recapitalize banks by converting 
eligible debt of a failing bank into common shares could have contributed to 
markets better internalizing risks since the crisis. 
Fourth, markets may discount the improvements in regulatory capital ratios 
because of variation across banks arising from diversity in regulatory defin-
itions and banks’ methodological choices. For example, a significant amount 
of variation in average risk weights has been attributed to differences in 
bank and supervisory practices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2013; Plosser and Santos 2014). 
Market-Based Indicators During Banking System Stress
The analysis so far does not address whether the market perceives the 
Canadian banking system as able to withstand a severe system-wide shock. 
This section applies two approaches to provide further insight into this 
question, with each approach having its own caveats. 
The first approach is to compare the current level of the Canadian index of 
banking system resilience with the levels of other banking systems at the 
onset of historical episodes of severe banking distress. The index levels for 
the banking systems in these regions can provide reference points for when 
banking system resilience was insufficient to withstand a severe system-
wide shock. The idea behind this approach is that a banking system that 
does not have an index value above these levels is unlikely to be sufficiently 
resilient.
Table 1 shows the results of this first approach, noting the levels of the 
banking system resilience index and each of the market-based indicators 
for a sample of major banks in countries at the onset of historical stress 
episodes.7 For each indicator, higher values are associated with more resili-
ence. The last row of the table reports the current levels for Canada for 
comparative purposes. The current level of the banking system resilience 
index for Canada in Table 1 is substantially higher than that of other econ-
omies at the onset of episodes of banking system distress, except for the 
Asian crisis, for which the difference is smaller. This suggests that, based on 
6 These factors are, to some extent, accounted for in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s 
assessment frameworks to determine the additional loss absorbency requirement for systemically 
important banks.
7 Except for the US and euro area crises, the level of the resilience index is not substantially higher in the 
12 months before the selected dates, but it is generally much lower in the 12 months that follow.
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the indicators, markets perceive the Canadian banking system to be more 
resilient than foreign banking systems that were insufficiently resilient to 
recover from historical episodes of severe system-wide stress.
There are several caveats to this approach, however. The first caveat is that 
there is no uniform method to choose the date at which banking systems were 
at the onset of episodes of severe distress. Historical crises often refer to a 
chain of events. Academics regularly disagree on the precise timing of crises 
because different methodologies may lead to differences regarding the years 
that a crisis actually took place; see, e.g., Laeven and Valencia (2013) and 
Chaudron and De Haan (2014). Another caveat of comparisons to the levels of 
indicators in historical crises is that some indicators are affected by changes 
in accounting standards over time (in particular, the MBCR), although less so 
than regulatory or accounting-based measures. Finally, the macroeconomic 
and regulatory environments for each of these historical stress episodes differ 
significantly from the current environment in Canada.
The second approach to provide a reference point for the resilience of 
banks is the SRISK methodology developed by Acharya et al. (2017) and 
Brownlees and Engle (2017). The idea behind this approach is that major 
issues in the banking system are relatively unlikely as long as banks’ MBCRs 
meet some target level. The banking system can then be considered 
resilient if banks still meet the target ratio after the system suffers from a 
hypothetical severe shock. By assessing forward-looking post-stress capital 
ratios, the SRISK methodology is more akin to a market-based stress test.
The aggregate SRISK measures the expected capital shortfall of the 
banking system after a system-wide shock. More specifically, it is the sum 
of money that would be needed to restore the capital ratio of each institution 
in the system to the target level following a six-month period of systemic 
stress. This amount depends on banks’ total assets, their initial MBCRs and 














Nordic crisis -52 4.1 2.9 -29.9 -2.0 -1.6 1991 (August) 8
Japanese crisis -54 7.5 3.5 -32.2 -3.2 -2.2 1992 (March) 15
Asian crisis -26 6.0 2.4 -25.7 -1.5 -1.3 1997 (June) 37
Argentine crisis -101 4.0 1.7 -53.7 -2.2 -2.1 2001 (November) 4
US crisis -81 7.7 3.1 -56.6 -3.5 -2.2 2008 (February) 25
Euro area crisis -152 3.3 2.5 -57.6 -7.2 -5.4 2010 (April) 30





Note: Higher values are associated with more resilience. 
a. The selected dates precede some of the major events that happened relatively early in these crises. For the Nordic crisis, August 1991 precedes the autumn in 
which Sweden and Finland stepped in in response to banks facing liquidity shortages, and Norway’s Government Bank Insurance Fund started to directly provide 
capital support to problem banks. For the Japanese crisis, March 1992 is the month preceding the fi rst quarterly decrease in the Japanese nominal house price 
index in a long slump in Japanese real estate prices during the 1990s. For the Asian crisis, June 1997 precedes the month with severe currency depreciations 
leading up to the Asian crisis. For the Argen tine crisis, November 2001 precedes the restrictions in bank withdrawals that were introduced in December and 
the abandonment of the peg of the Argentine peso to the US dollar in January 2002. For the US crisis, February 2008 precedes the failure of Bear Stearns in 
March 2008. For the euro area crisis, April 2010 is the month before the members of the euro area agreed to create the European Financial Stability Facility.
Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank of Canada calculations 
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the impact of the system-wide shock. The impact of the system-wide shock 
is based on the LRMES measure described in Box 1 and corresponds to 
the expected loss in a bank’s market capitalization in the worst 1 per cent 
of outcomes for the regional banking system over a six-month period. The 
SRISK measure for an individual bank is obtained by applying this shock to 
its current MBCR. The aggregate SRISK measure is then calculated as the 
sum of the capital shortfalls across banks.
Although the SRISK methodology can be considered a market-based stress 
test, it is not directly comparable to supervisory stress tests in every respect. 
Regulatory data on banks’ portfolio exposures can provide more information 
on the specific drivers of results in supervisory stress tests that are not identi-
fied by SRISK. Moreover, stress test models, such as the Bank of Canada’s 
MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), can shed light on the 
marginal impact of liquidity risk and network spillover effects (Anand, Bédard-
Pagé and Traclet 2014). Supervisory stress tests also typically estimate the 
impact of more specific scenarios beyond the six-month horizon used in the 
market-based stress test based on the SRISK methodology. 
Chart 5 shows the level of the SRISK measure for target ratios of 6 per cent 
and 8 per cent.8 For comparability over time, the SRISK measure is expressed 
as a percentage of nominal gross domestic product (GDP). The chart suggests 
that the Big Six banks in the Canadian banking system are currently able to 
withstand a six-month period of severe system-wide stress with a relatively 
small expected capital shortfall given a conservative target ratio of 8 per cent.9 
8 The target ratio based on market valuations cannot be directly compared with regulatory minimum cap-
ital ratios. In the academic literature, target ratios generally range from 5.5 per cent to 8 per cent. The 
8 per cent level also corresponds to the average MBCR of Canadian domestic systemically important 
banks in October 2008, when the Bank of Canada announced exceptional liquidity measures. 
9 The numbers in Chart 5 are different from those reported by New York University’s Volatility Laboratory 
for several reasons. First, we do not include non-bank financial institutions. Second, the target capital 
ratio before November 2011 is increased by a factor of 1.062 to adjust for a lower balance of total 
assets reported by banks under the pre-IFRS accounting standards; see, e.g., MacDonald, Van Oordt 
and Scott (2016). Third, our numbers focus on a 1 per cent worst outcome for the index of the Canadian 
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Chart 5: Expected capital shortfall of the Big Six Canadian banks after 
six months of severe syste m-wide stress as measured by SRISK 
methodology
Capital shortfall relative to a target of the market-based capital ratio, as a percentage of GDP
 Targeting a 6 per 
cent ratio
 Targeting an 8 per 
cent ratio
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From mid-2014 until early 2016, however, the level of the SRISK measure 
increased as commodity prices slid and global uncertainty grew. The initial 
low level around the summer of 2014 indicates that Canadian banks, at 
that time, were considered more resilient than after the fall in oil prices. 
The higher level in early 2016 suggests that an additional six-month period 
of severe system-wide stress in an environment of depressed commodity 
prices could have resulted in an MBCR significantly below the target of 
8 per cent. As such, market participants deemed the banking system to 
have a lower capacity to recover from additional setbacks during that 
period. The relatively high level of the peak in early 2016 is also due in part 
to the growth in the Canadian banking system, which has outpaced the 
growth in nominal GDP. As a result, the economic and fiscal consequences 
of instability in the banking system would be larger.
Conclusion
Market-based indicators are one of many tools used to assess banking 
system resilience. They are complementary to regulatory measures such 
as capital and leverage ratios as well as stress tests. These indicators help 
monitor the market’s current perception of the banking system’s capacity 
to withstand and quickly recover from a wide array of shocks. They reflect 
market information regarding the level of buffers in the banking system, the 
possible system-wide impact of shocks and the system’s ability to rebuild 
buffers from retained earnings after a shock. 
Overall, the indicators suggest that market participants perceive the 
Canadian banking system to be relatively resilient when compared with 
both the current situation in other advanced economies and with histor-
ical episodes at the onset of banking crises. This is consistent with the 
stress test conducted in the context of the International Monetary Fund’s 
Financial Sector Assessment Program, which demonstrated the resilience 
of the major financial institutions in Canada to risks arising from a severe 
stress scenario (IMF 2014). However, market-based indicators do not show 
a meaningful increase in resilience compared with the pre-crisis period, 
despite improvements in the levels of regulatory capital ratios. This can be 
partly explained by the additional aspects of banking system resilience cap-
tured by market-based indicators, including expectations regarding future 
earnings and the system-wide impact of shocks, but it may also reflect the 
market’s inability to detect the lack of resilience in the pre-crisis period. 
Market-based indicators should therefore be used as a part of a larger tool 
kit that takes into account other sources of information. 
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Appendix: Technical Details and List of Institutions
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where 𝐼𝑐,𝑡 refers to the level of the indicator and where, for example, 𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑅𝑐,𝑡 
corresponds to the weighted average of the market-based capital ratio in 
region 𝑐 at time 𝑡. Bank-specific market-based indicators are calculated for 
each of the financial institutions listed in Table A-1 following the method-
ology in MacDonald, Van Oordt and Scott (2016). The weights to calculate 
the average 𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑅𝑐,𝑡 in region 𝑐 at time 𝑡 are based on the book values of 
total assets at time 𝑡; the weights to calculate the average 𝐷𝐷𝑐,𝑡 are based 
on the book values of total debt; and the weights to calculate the average 
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑡, 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑡 and exposure ΔCoVaR𝑐,𝑡 are based on the market capital-
izations at time 𝑡. The numbers in the formula are the indicator weights as 
well as the indicator values for Canada in January 2004.
Table A-1: List of institutions
Region Institutions
Canada Big Six Canadian banks: Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank 
of Canada, Ba nk of Nova Scotia, Toronto-Dominion Bank
Australia Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National Australia Bank, Westpac Banking 
Corporation
Euro area ABN AMRO Bank (the Netherlands), Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), Alpha Bank (Greece), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
(Spain), Banco BPI (Portugal), Banco Comercial Português (Portugal), Banco Popular Español (Spain), Banco de 
Sabadell (Spain), Bank of Ireland (Ireland), Bank of Valletta (Malta), BNP Paribas (France), Caixa Economica Montepio 
Geral (Portugal), Commerzbank (Germany), Criteria CaixaHolding (Spain), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Erste Group Bank 
(Austria), Eurobank Ergasias (Greece), Groupe Crédit Agricole (France), ING Group (the Netherlands), Intesa Sanpaolo 
(Italy), KBC Groep (Belgium), Monte de Paschi di Siena (Italy), National Bank of Greece (Greece), Piraeus Bank (Greece), 
Raiffeisen Bank International (Austria), Santander (Spain), Šiaulių Bankas (Lithuania), Société Générale (France), Tatra 
banka (Slovakia), UniCredit (Italy)
United Kingdom Barclays Group, HSBC Holdings, Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, Standard Chartered
United States Ally Financial Inc., American Express Company, Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, 
BB&T Corporation, Capital One Financial Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Citizens Financial Group, Comerica Inc., Discover 
Financial Services, Fifth Third Bancorp, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Huntington Bancshares Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
KeyCorp, M&T Bank Corporation, Morgan Stanley, Northern Trust Corporation, PNC Financial Services Group, Regions 
Financial Corporation, State Street Corporation, SunTrust Banks Inc., U.S. Bancorp, Wells Fargo & Company, Zions 
Bancorporation
Note: Institutions are selected with the intention to capture the major listed banks in each country.
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